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The 340 subscribers to this, the first number of the 7th year of
publication of *LCM*, might be pardoned if they read the contents and
these notes for supposing that the threatened miniaturization (*LCM* 6.8
[Oct.1981], 93) has not been carried out, though they might be alerted
by its thinness and certain dittographies in the pagination of the con-
tents. Not so - they have only to turn the page to find that a Manches-
ter diatribe on diatribes and sermon on sermons (and other matters, but
not, this time, what they may have learned to think of as Manchester
matters [but Manchester is not in the country, and for those they must
turn to the other Manchester article]) has been compressed into 4½ pp.,
with consequent saving of paper and postage. It is to this and other
'technical causes' (a new printing machine is being installed) that the
Editor attributes the lateness of this number: subsequent ones, he hopes,
will be on time 'or or about the first of the month'.

The new format also avoids much white paper and the principle of a
new right-hand page for each article has had to be abandoned: there was
no evidence that anybody actually ever disbound and classified articles.
It also seems to make proof-reading easier: but this months apologies
for errors go to Professor R.J.Penella in whose article, *LCM* 6.9(Nov.
1981), 245-6, Olympiodorus of Thebes was attributed to Thrace (as Pro-
fessor Penella comments 'one fragmentary Olympiodorus is enough'): the

'recent article in *PLRE II*' referred to in the first paragraph on p. 245 is, of course, the article on Philtatius, as indicated in the reference in the next paragraph. He very much regrets these errors, which do seem to be inseparable from the production mode of *LCM*, and is grateful to contributors for their general tolerance of them. He could only wish that he could reduce the back-log of material and resume the rapid publication which was the original intention of *LCM*, though of course gratified at the way in which good material continues to arrive, and he asks intending contributors not to be deterred by these remarks. The new format should mean that each slimmer number can contain more material.

His remarks about Pedants and Communicators continue to provoke a trickle of responses, both H.D. Jocelyn and R.W. Sharples contributing some remarks in their articles, both perhaps 'fightin' words'. On the subject another correspondent opines that 'there is much to be said for the Communicators provided that what they communicate can pass the scrutiny of the Pedant. No doubt it is easier to pick holes in a translation of Persius (admittedly an author better left than most to the Pedants; if you can't enjoy his sinewy Latin and his re-jigged Horace, what possible enjoyment can you get out of him [a challenge there for somebody]?) than oneself to produce a good one; but when so much is false in style and even content, it is not communication but distortion. Housman himself, who did not disdain the name of pedant, knew that others less learned might be better critics of literature than the scholars; but that does not mean that every trendy fad of modern criticism - irony, ambiguity, structuralistic narcissism, Freudo-Lacanian sexual psychologism - should be gaily applied to ancient texts as if they had been written yesterday: it might be more useful to demonstrate why they are not applicable. In a work of Communication [he sees] no objection whatever to parallels from modern literature, provided that differences of spirit or intention are pointed out; even in a work of Pedantry they are occasionally useful (see Housman, *CPapers* 350) and even when (or usually) not, yet they are of legitimate interest (again, see Housman, *CPapers* 1195: "The imitations of Juvenal culled from the French poets are welcome for their literary interest", and this in a pretty dismissive review), though they should be offered as *mensae secundae* after a proper first course of scholarly comment (the fact that classical literature has inspired modern writers is one of the reasons for studying it). In view of Ferguson's article in the current *LCM*, we should perhaps devise a γένναϊον ψεύδος to persuade our Pedants to take over the task of Communication themselves, rather than leave it to the incompetent: in the present state of our culture classical studies are unlikely to flourish until the Pedants are Communicators and the Communicators Pedants'.

Remarks which should provide us all with appropriate New Year Resolutions - as it certainly has the Editor.

NOTE. The translators, David Harvey of the Department of Classics at Exeter and his wife Hazel, have taken over the remaining stock of their Karl Reinhardt, *Sophocles* (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1979, £15) and offer it at £7. Orders with remittance direct to them at

53 Thornton Hill, Exeter, Devon, EX4 4NR
Postage is extra: UK 2nd Class 87p. the Editor reckons.

In LCM 4.7(Jul.1979), 145-6, the notion that in some registers of ancient Greek the word διατριβή could denote a type of philosophical discourse or writing with definable characteristics was summarily rejected. Not for the first time. This notion, which was conceived, though not elaborated, by H.Usener (*Epicurea*, Leipzig 1887, lxix; cf. R.Hirzel, *Der Dialog*, Leipzig 1895, I 369 n.2 et passim, E.Norden, *Die antike Kunstprosa*, Leipzig 1898, I 129-30, II 556-8, P.Wendland, 'Philo und die kynisch-stoische Diatribe', in P.Wendland & O.Kern, *Beiträge zur Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie und Religion*, Berlin 1899, 4, P.Wendland, *Die hellenistisch-römische Kultur in ihren Beziehungen zu Judentum und Christentum*, Tübingen 1907, 39-43, R.Bultmann, *Der Stil der paulinischen Predigt und die kynisch-stoische Diatribe*, Göttingen 1910, 3ff., J.Geffcken, *Kynika und Verwandtes*, Heidelberg 1910), received a lengthy criticism in a 1911 Leipzig dissertation, O.Halbauer's *De diatribis Epicteti* (3-18). Most Hellenists now either avoid the word (cf. M.Pohlenz, *Die Stoa*, Göttingen 1949, I 226, II 137) or apologize for using it (cf. E.G.Schmidt, *Der kleine Pauly*, Band 2, Stuttgart 1967, s.v. *Diatribai*, D.A.Russell, *G&R* 2.15[1968], 137, Id., *Plutarch*, London 1973, 29 n.25, D.A.Russell & N.G.Wilson, *Menander Rhetor* edited with translation and commentary, Oxford 1981, 295, J.F.Kindstrand, *Bion of Borysthenes*, Uppsala 1976 [= *Studia Graeca Upsaliensia* XII], 21-5, 97-9). Theologians (cf. W.Capelle, *Reallexicon für Antike und Christentum*, Band 3, Lieferung 23, Stuttgart 1956, 990-97, s.v. *Diatriben*) and Latinists (cf. N.Rudd, *The Satires of Horace*, Cambridge 1966, 1ff., R.G.M.Nisbet & Margaret Hubbard, *A commentary on Horace's Odes Book I*, Oxford 1970, xiv et passim, E.J.Kenney, *Lucretius. De rerum natura III*, Cambridge 1971, 17-20, M.Coffey, *Roman Satire*, London 1976, 92-3, 232-3, M.T.Griffin, *Seneca. A philosopher in politics*, Oxford 1976, 13-16, N.Horsfall, LCM 4.6[Jun.1979], 117-9, 4.8[Oct.1979], 169-71) are less careful. The influential *Oxford Classical Dictionary* still carries an article, *Diatriben*, using the Greek word in Usener's manner (ed.² 1970, p.338).

Latinists have long been impressed by the way in which Usener linked Horace, *Epist.* 2.2.60 *ille Bionis sermonibus et sale nigro (delectatur)* with the ancient book title *Sermones* and Diogenes Laertius' reference to οἱ περὶ τὸν Βιῶνα ἐν ταῖς Διατριβαῖς (2.77). R.Heinze declared in his dissertation, *De Horatio Bionis imitatore*, Bonn 1889, 6: *satiras scripserat Lucilius: Horatius composuit sermones, qui non propter humile tantum et vulgare genus dicendi ita nuncupantur sed quod Bionis imitantur Διατριβὰς*. N.Horsfall's 'Horace will have known the Greek for Bionis sermonibus' (LCM 4.8[Oct.1979], 170) expresses epigrammatically a very common view.

The evidence on how the verb διατρίβειν and its derivative noun διατριβή functioned in ancient Greek has not been properly assembled. J.Gluckler's useful discussion at *Antiochus and the Later Academy* (Göttingen 1978 [*Hypomnemata* 56]), 162-6, is angled towards the question of what words Greek and Latin applied to the philosophical school. The passages which theorists of the 'Hellenistic' or 'Cynic-Stoic' 'diatribe' commonly cite do not bear the weight they are given. Horace, *Epist.* 2.2.60, can be understood without adducing much more than the semantic field of the Latin noun *sermo*. This paper attempts to collect the material relevant to a sober consideration of Usener's notion and to discuss it critically. I am grateful to David Bain for drawing my attention to Eusebius, *Praep.Euang.* 14.6.6, and the passage of Numenius cited there. I should not otherwise have been tempted to look for more instances of the book title αἱ Διατριβαί than those which the diatribe theorists cite from each other.

The verb διατρίβειν was often used absolutely in the general sense of 'let or make time pass'. Nowhere in recorded literature, not even at Plato, *Phaedo* 59d5, does it require to be interpreted as 'talk'. No special use developed. It never, for example, functioned as a synonym of φιλοσοφείν. A passage like Posidonius, ap. Athenaeus 5.211e, ἐν τῇ ἑρωμνέως σχολῇ διατρίβει τις Ἀθηναίων προσκαρτερῶν τοῖς λόγοις would be fairly placed under a rubric διατρίβειν: 'spend time'. The noun διατριβή, on the other hand, while never losing a general abstract sense related closely to that of διατρίβειν, could be applied to study, to a group of persons engaged in study, particularly in philosophical study, even to the place where such study took place and its physical appurtenances (cf. Epicurus ap. Diog.Laert.10.17, Strato ap. Diog.Laert.5.61). Philosophical study was always a group activity and talking an almost necessary accompaniment. Posidonius had Athenion say (Athenaeus 5.213d) μὴ περιιδμεν δέ, ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τὴν ἱερὰν τοῦ Ἰάκχου φωνὴν κατασεσιγασμένην καὶ τὸ σεμνὸν ἀνάκτορον τοῦν θεοῦ κεκλημένον καὶ τῶν φιλοσόφων τὰς διατριβὰς ἀφώνους. Here διατριβή denoted a place where a group studied. This usage had some vigour, but eventually declined in the face of a similar one of σχολή. There are a number of passages where διατριβή seems to approach διάλογος and διάλεξις in sense. We may discount the two most commonly cited: Hermogenes, *Meth.* 5, p.418.3 Rabe, διατριβή ἐστὶ βραχέος διανοήματος ἡθεικοῦ ἔκτασις (listed in H.Stuart Jones' revision of the lexicon of Liddell and Scott along with the book title αἱ Διατριβαί under the rubric 'short ethical treatise or lecture') and Suda, II p.75 Adler, διατριβή ... διάλεξις φιλόσοφος. The latter is merely an attempt by a Byzantine reader of Arrian's work on Epictetus (see below) to interpret its title. Hermogenes' statement ought always to be given in full - διατριβή ἐστὶ βραχέος διανοήματος ἡθεικοῦ ἔκτασις, ἵνα ἐμείνη τὸ ἥθος τοῦ λέγοντος ἐν τῇ γνώμῃ τοῦ ἀκούοντος - along with the two passages of Demosthenes (18.1-2 & 21.1) which accompany it. The rhetorician was not talking about universally recognized genres of philosophical literature but about a number of types of oratorical redundancy discerned by himself. His use of διατριβή served a typical set of subtle discriminations fully comprehensible only within his own general system, but did not depart all that far from rhetorical tradition (cf. Aristotle, *Rhet.* 3.17, 1418a27-9). Where other passages are concerned, it is significant that, while some might suggest a conversation in which a number of

speakers participate (cf. Plutarch, *Mor.* 43e, 58f, 70e, 135d, 796d; Porphyry, *Vit. Plot.* 3.34-8, brought somewhat misleadingly by Glucker, *Antiochus and the Later Academy* 162-6, under a rubric 'class, seminar' as opposed to 'formal lecture'), none relate to the special kind of monologue imagined for the Cynics and Stoics by Usener and his followers.

Those who wrote about Socrates during the years after his death put much emphasis on his loquacity, and a passage of Plato's *Ἀπολογία Σωκράτους* has often been cited as providing an example of the plural διατριβαί applied to philosophical discourse. At 37c7-d3 Plato has Socrates say: ὡμεις μὲν ὄντες πολῖται μου οὐχ οἰοί τε ἐγένεσθε ἐνεργεῖν τὰς ἐμὰς διατριβάς καὶ τοὺς λόγους, ἀλλ' ὅμιν βαρύτεραι γέγονασιν καὶ ἐπιφρονότεραι ὥστε ζητεῖτε αὐτῶν νυνὶ ἀπαλλαγῆναι. ἄλλοι δὲ ἴδρα αὐτὰς οἴσουσι ῥαδίως. Commentators adduce *Gorgias* 484e1-3: ὥσπερ γε οἶμαι οἱ πολιτικοί, ἐπειδὴν αὐ εἰς τὰς ὡμείων διατριβάς ἔλθουσιν καὶ τοὺς λόγους, καταγελαστοί εἰσιν (Callicles to Socrates). What the first of the pair of nouns signified was not the particular 'discourse' of Socrates but the general activities in which he and his friends participated. The same use of διατριβαί appears at *Charmides* 153a1-3: ἤκομεν τῇ προτεραίᾳ ἐσπέρας ἐκ Ποτειδαίας ἀπὸ τοῦ στρατοπέδου, οἷον δὲ διὰ χρόνου ἀφιγμένους ἀσμένως ἤμα ἐπὶ τὰς συνήθεις διατριβάς (Socrates speaking), *Clitopho* 406a1-3: Κλειτοφῶντα τὸν Ἀριστωνύμου τις ἡμῖν διηγείτο ἑναγχος, ὅτι Λυσία διαλεγόμενος τὰς μὲν μετὰ Σωκράτους διατριβάς ψέγει, τὴν θρασυμάχου δὲ συνουσίαν ὑπερπαίνοι (Socrates speaking), *Epistula* 7.329a7-b3: ἀλλ' ἤλθον μὲν κατὰ λόγον ἐν δίκη τε ὥς οἶδ' ἐν τῇ ἀνθρώπων μάλιστ', διὰ τε τὰ τοιαῦτα καταλιπὼν τὰς ἐμὰς διατριβάς, οὕσας οὐκ ἀσχήμενος, ὑπὸ τυραννίδι δοκοῦσαν οὐ πρόπειν τοῖς ἐμοῖς λόγοις οὐδὲ ἐμοί (Plato to friends of Dion). It is not a use restricted to Plato. From Plato's contemporary Isocrates may be cited 9.74 τοὺς λόγους ... διαδοθέντας ἐν ταῖς τῶν εὐφρονοῦντων διατριβαῖς; from imperial literature Plutarch, *Pericles* 36.3 πρῶτον μὲν ἐκφέρων ἐπὶ γέλῳ τὰς οἷμαι διατριβάς αὐτοῦ καὶ τοὺς λόγους οὓς ἐποίησε μετὰ τῶν σοφιστῶν and Lucian, *Parasit.* 32 Αἰσχίνης ... παρασιτῶν Διονυσίῳ καὶ ταῖς Σωκράτους διατριβαῖς ἐρωθῆσαι φάσας. These διατριβαί of Pericles, of Socrates, of Plato and of Isocrates certainly involved discourse (λόγοι) by the persons named, but also discourse by others present. Nor was discourse restricted to the themes which enthused the Cynics and the Stoics.

The certainly ancient passage which comes nearest to presenting the singular διατριβή in the sense of philosophical discourse is Diogenes Laertius 3.8 ὁ δ' οὖν φιλόσοφος καὶ ἰσοκράτης φίλος ἦν. καὶ αὐτῶν προξιφάνης ἀνέγραψε διατριβὴν τινα περὶ ποιητῶν γενομένην ἐν ἀγρῷ παρὰ Πλάτωνι ἐπιξενοθέντος τοῦ ἰσοκράτους. It is hard, however, to imagine either Plato or Isocrates monopolizing the occasion in the manner of a Cynic or a Stoic. And Plato would certainly have had other guests besides Isocrates. By διατριβή Diogenes seems to have meant something like 'studious debate'; he used this word rather than διάλογος because σχολαστικοί (for this word used of the studious see Theophrastus ap. Diogenes Laertius 5.37) rather than men of the world were involved.

The title of one of the eighty pieces of oratorical prose extant under the name of Dio Cocceianus ('Chrysostom'), *Διατριβὴ περὶ τῶν ἐν συμποσίῳ* (27), might seem to be best translated 'Discourse on what happens at a symposium'. In style this piece is extremely simple, as is that of 6 (*Διογένης ἡ περὶ τυραννίδος*), 8 (*Διογένης ἡ περὶ ἀρετῆς*), 9 (*Διογένης ἡ ἰσομικός*) and 10 (*Διογένης ἡ περὶ οἰκέτων*). Ethics likewise is its general theme. It has the form of a monologue. I suspect that its title lies at the bottom of the whole modern notion of the 'Cynic-Stoic diatribe'. There is no reason to suppose that Dio himself bestowed the title or even that it is ancient. I should point out that the gender of titular adjectives like ἰσομικός shows that the noun λόγος in antiquity applied indiscriminately to all Dio's pieces, both those which the moderns call 'diatribes' and the formal orations. Where the title of the twenty-seventh λόγος is concerned, διατριβή must be related in some way to its subject matter rather than to its stylistic shape. Argument, however, about the intention of the person who bestowed the title is difficult since very little of the content of the piece in fact relates to the symposium.

The book titles αἱ τοῦ δεῖνα Διατριβαί and αἱ Διατριβαί are solidly evidenced for antiquity. I find one or the other associated with Archytas, Aristippus, Diogenes, Zeno, Cleanthes, Persaeus, Sphaerus, Aristo, Dicaeocles/Diocles, and Bion. Those who talk these days about the 'Cynic-Stoic diatribe' never mention Archytas or Dicaeocles/Diocles. Conveniently. Nor do they explain the connexion between Aristippus and the Cynics. It is assumed that all the works called αἱ Διατριβαί vel sim. had a common formal structure distinguishing them from, say, Plato's dialogues. H.B. Gottschalk, *Mnemosyne* 33(1980), 361, applies with care the current orthodoxy to Aristo's writings: 'they included lectures (σχολαί) and diatribes. These categories will hardly have differed in content, and in form less than one might suppose; since there is no reason to think that the dialogues were more genuinely dramatic than the other Hellenistic dialogues of which we know, and the diatribe-form always contained a rudimentary dramatic element (in the use of the 'imaginary opponent'), the brief difference may have been that the author spoke in his own person in the one and through his character in the other'. A dispassionate consideration of the evidence does not support orthodoxy.

Detailed argument must begin where the evidence is most complete. Four volumes survive of the eight which Simplicius, Photius and the mediaeval tradition knew as composing Arrian's αἱ Ἐπικτήτου Διατριβαί. In the preface to the first volume Arrian describes his work as ὑπομνήματα and the discourses of Epictetus reported therein as λόγοι. He insists on the exactness of his reporting. The philosopher's class room provides the milieu, but there is nothing premeditated about what is said. No discourse has a formal shape. The plainest style of contemporary Greek is used. Aulus Gellius refers to the work at 1.2.6 - *iussitque proferri dissertationum Epicteti*

digestarum ab Arriano primum librum -, 17.19.2 - Arrianus solitum eum dictitare in libris quos de dissertationibus eius composuit -, 19.1.14 - librum protulit Epicteti philosophi quintum διαλέξεων, quas ab Arriano digestas congruere scriptis Ζήνωνος et Chrysippi non dubium est. The word *dissertatio* was clearly Gellius' Latin equivalent of διάλεκτος (cf. 12.1 tit., 14.3.5, 17.13.11). There is no need, however, to suppose that αἱ Ἐπικτήτου Διαλέξεις rather than αἱ Ἐπικτήτου Διατριβαί was the title carried by Gellius' copy of Arrian's work. Gellius had in mind simply what Arrian described as λόγοι. Arrian wrote another work about Epictetus which the tradition knew as αἱ Ἐπικτήτου Ὀμιλῖαι (Photius, *Bibl. cod.* 58, p.17^b 11ff.), presumably reporting more formal types of discourse. In the body of αἱ Ἐπικτήτου Διατριβαί he made Epictetus apply the word διατριβή to spending time in philosophical study and other kinds of activity (2.16.29; 3.24.40, 68, 72, 75, 109) but never to speaking as such. It must accordingly be supposed that the title relates not to the informal λόγοι reported in the work but to the way in which the philosopher generally occupied himself. Lexicographers ought not to separate it from such passages as Plato, *Apology* 37c8 ἐνεγκεῖν τὰς ἐμὰς διατριβὰς and Arrian, *Diatr.* 3.24.40 ἄγε φέρε μοι καὶ σὺ τὴν σουτοῦ διατριβήν, ἣν ποθεῖς, ζηλωτὰ τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ σωφρότους καὶ Διογένης.

Certain entries in the Ἐκλογαὶ ἀποφθέγματα ὑποθήκαι of Johannes of Stobaei ('Stobaeus') indicate that Arrian was using a form of title with a long prehistory: 1.pr.4 ἐκ τῶν Ἀρχύτου Διατριβῶν introducing a statement (in Doric Greek) about the relations between arithmetic and geometry; 3.13.37 ἐκ τῶν Διογένης Διατριβῶν introducing an anecdote about Diogenes; 3.13.38 ἐν ταύτῃ introducing another anecdote about the same philosopher; 4.8.27 ἐκ τῶν Διογένης Διατριβῶν introducing a statement about life and death elsewhere attributed to Diogenes. In the case of Archytas we do not have, as Diels, Kranz and others have thought, a work written by the Tarentine philosopher but rather a report of what he talked about with students. Presumably a report published by one or more of these students. Certainly there is no reason to think it a work of late antiquity and no-one to my knowledge has thought so. αἱ Διογένης Διατριβαί on the other hand has been thought to be such a work, put together from the λόγοι of Dio and other late writings about Diogenes. No title αἱ Διατριβαί appears in the lists of Diogenes' writings cited at Diogenes Laertius 6.80. The philosopher from Sinope, however, was already a legend in his own lifetime and if one or more associates put out αἱ Διογένης Διατριβαί here was the likely source of Dio, 'Stobaeus' and many other narrators of the legend. What this legend alleges about Diogenes and the very different legend which surrounds the name of Archytas should warn us against seeking a common structure or style in their reported utterances. Arrian would have got his title from the sort of work cited by Stobaeus, but his account of the λόγοι of Epictetus came, as he says, from life.

The biographies of Diogenes Laertius provide lists of the respective philosophers' writings (πίνακες). Many of these (2.83-4 & 85, 7.36, 163, 175, 178) contain items with the title αἱ Διατριβαί, never defined by the genitive of a philosopher's name (as with Arrian's work) but sometimes accompanied by an indication of the subject matter (7.163 Περὶ σοφίας Διατριβαί and ἐρωτικαὶ Διατριβαί; 7.178 Περὶ Ἡρακλείτου Διατριβαί). They oppose the term διατριβή to ἀπομνήμεια (7.36, 163), to διάλογος (2.83-4, 7.163, 178), to ἐπιστολή (2.84, 7.163, 178), to σχολή (7.163), to τέχνη (7.34, 178), to ὑπόμνημα (7.163), to χρεία (2.83-4, 85, 7.36, 163, 175), and often reveal uncertainty about the authorship of works carrying διατριβή in the title (2.84, 7.163). The πίναξ of the works of Zeno (7.4) omits the Διατριβαί cited at 7.34. About the contents of these works we know nothing, except in the case of the six books of Διατριβαί attributed to Aristippus (2.83-4, 85). From Theopompus, *FGH* F 259 (see below), it is clear that Socrates, not Aristippus, was the dominating personage. The uncertainty about the authorship of this work (2.84) and of one attributed variously to Aristo of Chios and Aristo of Ceos (7.163) suggests that all such works may have circulated originally under the αἱ τοῦ δεῖνα Διατριβαί type of title. If they were reports of philosophers' activities like Arrian's work, uncertainty about the identity of the reporter is understandable. The frequent opposition between διάλογος and διατριβή and our knowledge of the Διαλόγοι written by Plato permit two further guesses: διατριβή had to do with conversation between a philosopher and serious students in a professional milieu whereas διάλογος had to do with conversation among all types of men in a non-professional milieu; and whereas the latter could be fictional (cf. Athenaeus 4.162b, 5.216c, 11.508c-d; Diogenes Laertius 3.35) the former was factual. The evidence of the πίνακες allows no guesses about the formal structure of philosophical discourse in the works in question.

We may now proceed to evidence about the title αἱ Διατριβαί less responsive to systematic treatment. We shall find confirmation for some of the guesses made above, but none for the orthodox theory about the 'structure of the diatribe'.

The title αἱ Διατριβαί does not, as I have said, appear in Diogenes' list of Zeno's writings (7.4). Sextus Empiricus, however, reports a conversation between Zeno and a pederast as recorded by Zeno himself ἐν ταῖς Διατριβαῖς (*Math.* 11.190: cf. *Pyrrh.* 3.245) and Diogenes declares (7.33-4) that Zeno discussed sexual matters in a scandalous way not only in his Πολιτεία (listed at 7.4) but also at the beginning of a work entitled ἡ Ἐρωτικὴ τέχνη (perhaps listed at 7.4 as Τέχνη) and ἐν ταῖς Διατριβαῖς. We may have here yet another work of dubious authorship, a work in which Zeno figured as the chief personage.

Athenaeus reports a story about a pupil of Plato's who attempted to establish a tyranny in his native city on the authority of Εὐρύπλοος καὶ Δικαιοκλῆς ὁ Κνίδιος ἐνενηκοστῶ καὶ πρώτῳ (ἐν εἰκοστῷ Musurus) Διατριβῶν (11.508f). Numenius of Apamea (ap. Eusebius, *Praep. evang.* 14.6.6, II p.214 Mras = fr.25 Des Places) cites αἱ ἐπιγραφόμεναι Διατριβαί of one Diocles as his source for a story about the timidity of Arcesilaus, the sixth head of the Academy, in the face of Bion and

the pupils of Theodorus. Both Diocles and Dicaeocles came from Cnidos, and Wilamowitz brusquely identified them (*Antigonos von Karystos* = *Philologische Untersuchungen* IV, Berlin 1881, 313 n.23). It may be a question, however, rather of uncertainty of authorship. In any case the size and duality of authorship alleged by Athenaeus are interesting.

The commonly accepted doctrine that the ethical teachings of the third century philosopher Dion of Olbia/Borysthenes were recorded in their given form in a work called αὶ Διατριβαί depends on a careless interpretation of Diogenes Laertius 2.77: τοῦ δὲ θεράποντος ἐν ὁδῷ βασιλάκοντος ἀργύριον καὶ βαρυνομένου, ὃς φασιν οἱ περὶ τὸν Βίωνα ἐν ταῖς Διατριβαῖς, 'ἀπόχες'. ἔφη (sc. 'Αριστιππος'), 'τὸ πλέον καὶ ὅσον δύνανται βάζαζε.'. It was under the influence of this doctrine that at LCM 4.7 (Jul.1979), 145, I translated οἱ περὶ τὸν Βίωνα as 'the pupils of Bion'. More careful perusal of the φιλοσόφων βίων καὶ δογμάτων συναγωγή reveals that the formula οἱ περὶ τὸν δεῖνα occurs nowhere else in the company of a book title (see 1.12, 30; 2.38, 43, 105 (bis), 134; 4.40, 41; 5.67; 7.32, 68, 76, 84, 92, 128, 146, 159; 9.37, 41, 42, 62, 107; 10.4, 8) and along with S. L.Radt's recent disquisition on οἱ περὶ τὸν δεῖνα, ZPE 38(1980), 47-58, persuades me that 'Bion and his associates' would get closer to Diogenes' meaning at 2.77. The work was one of either multiple or dubious authorship. Diogenes seems to have had no list of Bion's titles available to him (cf. 4.47 πλεῖστά τε καταλέλοιπεν ὑπομνήματα ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀποφθέγματα ...). The work titled αὶ Διατριβαί cannot, however, be considered to have contained the discourses which brought Bion contemporary and posthumous notoriety. The common doctrine is refuted not only by the analogy of what is known of the contents of the works attributed to Aristippus and others but also by the actual content of Diogenes' quotation. Diogenes or his source thought it related to the Socratic Aristippus, but this philosopher was often confused with his homonymous nephew, who taught Theodorus of Cyrene (ὁ ἄθεος). Bion attended the classes of Theodorus, as of several other philosophers resident in Athens in the late fourth century, and it is much more likely that Theodorus related anecdotes about his own teacher than that the irreverent Bion mentioned either of the Aristippi except in reporting the discourses of others.

There is one passage in which διατριβή plainly related to a type of writing: Athenaeus' citation (11.508c-d) of the Καταδρομή τῆς Πλάτωνος διατριβῆς by Isocrates' pupil Theopompus, FGH F 259 - τοὺς πολλοὺς τῶν διαλόγων αὐτοῦ ἀχρεῖους καὶ ψευδεῖς ἂν τις εἴποι· ἄλλοτρίους δὲ τοὺς πλείους, ὄντας ἐκ τῶν 'Αριστίππου διατριβῶν, ἐνίοις δὲ καὶ τῶν 'Αντισθένης, πολλοὺς δὲ καὶ τῶν Βρόσσωνος. Where Aristippus is concerned Theopompus had in mind the work which appears in Diogenes' two πινάκες (2.83-4, 85). Accounts of Socrates also, it is clear, circulated in the fourth century under the names of Antisthenes and Bryson and under the same title. Theopompus regarded these as truthful accounts and quite different from some in Plato's δῖδλογοι. We learn nothing, however, about the mode and structure of the true Socrates' discourse. It would be illegitimate to guess that Aristippus, Antisthenes and Bryson made him talk like a Diogenes or a Zeno.

The result of this enquiry is largely negative: titles of the type αὶ Διατριβαί relate very closely to the special sense of διατριβή observable at Epicurus ap. Diogenes Laertius 10.17, Praxiphanes ap. Diogenes Laertius 3.8, and Posidonius ap. Athenaeus 5.213d; they do not imply any particular manner of philosophical discourse.

Kindstrand, *Bion of Borysthenes* (see the bibliography in the first paragraph on p.31, 96, declares: 'so long as it is clearly realized that the concept διατριβή, meaning popular philosophical dialectic, is a modern construction, I do not think that this use would do any harm, especially as the concept διατριβή seems to fill a need.'. Heroin fills a need too, among some people. More seriously, it ought to be pointed out that the most instructive account of third century philosophical writing remains the one penned by Wilamowitz in his youth, *Antigonos von Karystos* pp.292ff., and neither διατριβή nor 'Diatribē' appears in it (cf. also H.von Arnim, *Leben und Werke des Dio von Prusa*, Berlin 1898, passim and especially 30 ['die Literaturgattung der Diatriben'], 179-180). In later works of vulgarization (cf. *Die griechische Literatur des Altertums* = *Die Kultur der Gegenwart* I viii³, Berlin 1912, 163-4) Wilamowitz did throw the term about, probably in the interests of simplicity of exposition. The truth about antiquity is never simple and scholars ought not to try to make it seem so. There are some too who seize upon apparent technicisms like 'diatribe' in order to mystify those outside their professional group. No encouragement whatsoever should be given to such persons.

If οἱ περὶ τὸν Βίωνα reported the discourses of older philosophers ἐν ταῖς Διατριβαῖς and if this title related more to the circumstances in which the discourses were delivered than to the discourses themselves, Usener's association of Diogenes Laertius 2.77 with Horace, *Epist.* 2.2.60 leads nowhere. Calls upon students of Horace's *Sermones* and *Epistulae* to consider 'the formal elements of Greek diatribe' (LCM 4.6 (Jun.1979), 118) are mere words in the wind.

Horace's three verses *denique non omnes eadem mirantur amantque:*
 carmine tu gaudes, hic delectatur iambis,
 ille Bioneis sermonibus et sale nigro

are not easy to put

into plain unambiguous Latin, much less into the English of modern scholiasts. Those who assert that the poet is referring directly and specifically to the first three of the books titled *Carmina* by the grammarians of late antiquity and by the mediaeval tradition, to the book titled *Epodoe* and the two books titled *Sermones* cannot be refuted. On the other hand, the context strongly suggests that it is a question of three types of poetry. In either case the use of the word *sermo* is quite comprehensible within the boundaries of ordinary Latin usage and even of Horace's idiolect. Opposed to *carmen* and *iambus* it surely had some reference to the non-poetic (i.e. non-lyric, non-iambic) character of the vocabulary of *satura* (see also Horace, *Serm.* 1.4.

39-62 ... *sermoni propiora*, (41) ... *nisi quod pede certo | differt sermoni, sermo merus* (47-48) [where the opposition is with epic vocabulary] and compare Cicero, *Orator* 67 *comicoorum poetarum; apud quos, nisi quod uersiculi sunt, nihil est aliud cotidiani dissimile sermonis*, and schol. Hephaest. p.115.14-15 *Consbruch τὸν γὰρ βίον οὗτοι (i.e. οἱ κωμικοὶ) μιμνῶμενοι θέλουσι δοκεῖν διαλεγόμενος διαλέγεσθαι καὶ μὴ ἐμμέτρως*). Just as surely it had some reference also to the circumstances in which the author of a *satura* presented himself as making utterance; in other words it made clear that he did not see himself as a *fidicen* or his hearers as members of a formally invited social group. It needed the company of the adjective *Bioneus* to acquire a philosophical reference in the passage under discussion. Elsewhere in Horace's verse it denoted many kinds of discourse, including the kind which the pupils of Socrates affected to record (*Carm.* 3.21.9-10). The only question is why, apart from the need to fill a hexameter and complete a climax, Horace wrote *Bioneis sermonibus et sale nigro* instead of *saturis*.

The answer to this question lies in the efforts of ancient *grammatici* to categorize the hexameter poems of Horace's model Lucilius according to the standard Greek generic scheme (not to be confused with latter-day 'generic' theory). The manner of Lucilius reminded some of the *παρά- βασις* of a fifth century Attic comedy (cf. Horace, *Serm.* 1.4.1-7), others of the discourse of Bion of Olbia/Borysthenes (cf. Pseudacro, Horace, *Epist.* 2.2.60). Just as Bion described himself, the itinerant son of a salted-fish merchant, conversing freely with kings, so too did the colonial Lucilius describe his conversations with the nobles of Rome. With *sermo* Horace glanced at the verbal style of his *saturae*, with *Bioneus* and *sal niger* at their content and spirit. Too much should not be made of this conventional comparison of the *saturarum* scriptor with Bion. The Horace of the *Sermones* was not a professional philosopher but a *scriba quaestorius*, not a vagabond intellectual but a fully accepted and loyal member of one citizen-body. His hearers and interlocutors were rarely students of philosophy. Nothing is to be gained from entangling the history of Roman *satura* with that of Greek philosophical instruction.

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D.M.Bain(Manchester): κατωνάκην τὸν χοῖρον ἀποτετιλμένης (Aristophanes, *Ekklesiiazousai* 724)

LCM 7.1(Jan.1982), 7-10

In a note appended to David Whitehead's interesting paper 'The serfs of Sicyon' (*LCM* 6.2[Feb. 1981], 37-41), the Editor asks 'is it only the Editor's dirty mind which takes Aristophanes' point in *Ecc.* 724 to be that these slave women have indicated their status by arranging τὰ κάτω μέση in the form of a κόκος by selective depilation?' (41). Since I believe that this is at least half way to the correct interpretation of the line, and since the latest editor of the play (R.G. Ussher, Oxford 1973, on 722-4), while clearly understanding its meaning, does not offer an extended discussion or bring out fully the implications of the passage, I propose here to present a full discussion of the phrase κατωνάκην τὸν χοῖρον ἀποτετιλμένης, bringing it into line with a number of similar passages for whose construction I will offer an explanation. Most of these passages have been collected and discussed before (most notably by Dobree, *Adversaria* IV, 236), but I believe that a more extended and explicit discussion of them will be of value now. I confess that I do not properly understand Dr Whitehead's interpretation of *Ecc.* 724 (39). I suspect that he has misunderstood its point and supposed that it refers to total depilation of the pubic region, but since he has expressed himself in what to me at any rate appears a rather elliptical manner I cannot be certain of this, and apologize if it turns out that I have taken him to mean the opposite of what he intended. Ordinarily I am all for brevity in academic discussion, but on 'this subject', where misunderstanding is particularly rife, I find it pays to make things clear. While I cannot agree with Dr Whitehead when he says that 'the message is obvious', I do agree that Bentley's emendation (it occurred independently to both Tyrwhitt and Dobree) κατωνάκην for the MSS's κατωνάκη is inevitable. The arguments here presented should make it obvious why I do, and I see no point in adding to the length of this note by taking into consideration the various attempts that have been made to defend the dative of the paradosis.

Let us consider our line in its context. In conversation with Blepyros, Praxagora is outlining her programme for giving free women a better time of it sexually. The conversation goes as follows:

Βλ. ἤδη γὰρ εὐαχρησόμεθα: Πρ. φῆμ' ἐγώ.
ἔπειτα τὰς πόρναις καταπαῦσαι βούλομαι ἀπαξάσας. Βλ. ἴνα τί; Πρ. ὄηλον τουτογί.
720 ἴνα τῶν νέων ἔχωσιν αὐταὶ τὰς ἀκμὰς.
καὶ τὰς γε.δοῦλας οὐχὶ δεῖ κοσμομενῆας
τὴν τῶν ἐλευθέρων ὑπερσπάξεν Κύπριν,
ἐλλὰ παρὰ τοῖς δοῦλοισι κοιμᾶσθαι μόνον
κατωνάκην τὸν χοῖρον ἀποτετιλμένης.

Praxagora intends putting a stop to the two alternative sexual outlets available to Athenian males desiring sexual intercourse of a heterosexual nature but not wishing to make love to free women. Prostitution is abolished. Secondly slave women will be permitted to sleep only with slave men, κατωνάκην τὸν χοῖρον ἀποτετιλμένης. It is implied that before the revolution slave women had been usurping the privileges of free women (οὐχὶ δεῖ κοσμομενῆας | τὴν τῶν ἐλευθέρων ὑπερσπάξεν Κύπριν). *Nous avons changé tout cela. Now* they must sleep with slaves, plucked κατωνάκην. In this context

it is clear that *κατωνάκη* indicates some form of degradation for the women slaves. *κοσμομένης* in 721 stands in opposition to *κατωνάκη* ... *ἀποτετιμένης* and provides the key to the interpretation of the tone of that phrase.

A word is now necessary on the practice of public depilation among Greek women in antiquity. It seems clear that depilation of the pubic region, whether complete or virtually complete, was part of the toilet of any Greek woman who had pretensions to smartness or glamour. This practice, performed by plucking or singeing and widespread in antiquity (N.B. Aristophanes, *Ekk1.12f.*, *Thesm.236ff.*, Plato comicus 174.14f., and see Herter, 'Genitalien', *RAC* X 22, Engelbrecht, *WSt* 28[1906], 138ff., and Housman, *The Classical Papers*, 1056f., who speaks of 'an ordinary feature of the feminine toilet, *munditiae muliebres*, perpetuated in marble and still imposed as a convention on sculptors of the nude by the prestige of antiquity') is naturally often to be found mentioned in erotic contexts, and commonly associated with prostitutes and the like (cf. Kratinos, fr.256, Aristophanes, *Frogs* 515f., Pherekrates, fr.108.28f. - quoted below as *c.ii* - and Herondas 2.68f. as explained by Housman). In *Lysistrate* when the heroine begins to outline her stratagem she says (149f.)

εἰ γὰρ καθήμεθ' ἔνδον ἐντετριμμένοι,
κὼν τοῖς χιτωνίοισι τοῖς Ἀμοργίνοις
γυναιὶ παρίοιμεν δέλτα παρατετιμέναι,
σπένοντο δ' ἄνδρες ...

In order to make themselves alluring the women are to put on make up, wear their finest diaphanous clothing and have themselves plucked stylishly in the pubic region (on the meaning of δέλτα παρατετιμέναι see below). This is relevant to our passage. *κοσμομένης* there squares with *ἐντετριμμένοι* and *χιτωνίοισι τοῖς Ἀμοργίνοις* here. In *Ekklesiastousai*, if the old order remained, slave women would still be permitted to depilate themselves like the women in *Lysistrate*. Now they are to be debarred from trying to improve their appearance in the manner available to free women. They will no longer be allowed to make themselves attractive to men, no longer permitted a full toilet, and will be forced to sleep only with slaves. They are to be humiliated and put in their place as punishment for their previous presumption, set on a level with those who are considered sexually past it (note Martial 10.90.3 and the implications of Aristophanes, *Lys.* 823-8 and perhaps *Thesm.* 538: it must be said that hairiness in the pubic area is supposed to appeal to some men, but I know of no instance in Greek literature or graffiti - there does appear to be a Greek graffito referring to some form of depilation, *IG* 12 suppl. 64, black figure vase from Mytilene [see Scheffold, *ArchAnz* 1933, p.152 fig.123 - where such a predilection is expressed. Note, however, a possible Pompeian example. *Carm.Epigr.* 230 [CIL 4 1830], if correctly read and restored, gives us a wall-writer expressing and justifying a preference for a *cunnius pilosus* against a *cunnius glaber*, a reference for which I am indebted to H.D.Jocelyn). The sense, then, demanded for *κατωνάκη* τὸν χοῖρον παρατετιμένης is 'negligently depilated' or 'depilated not at all' (Ussher).

How does the phrase come to mean this? By reason of the visual implications of *κατωνάκη*. Praxagora is saying 'slave women must sleep with slaves only, depilated as to their pubic region so that it [the pubic region] comes to be [i.e. to look like] a *κατωνάκη*. If, as the transparent etymology of the word suggests and as ancient lexicography asserts (here we may be faced with mere guesswork) the garment in question was some kind of peasant overcoat (presumably rough and unkempt) with a straggling lambswool fringe at the bottom, the image is not difficult to comprehend. Henceforth slave women will be forced to neglect their pubic hair, and as a consequence it will grow prodigiously long and hang down intercrurally. The effect is hardly, as suggested by the Editor, a deliberate one on the part of the slave women, nor is it, as Süss has argued (*RM* 97[1954], 152) the result of incompetence (Süss, despite realizing the implications of *κατωνάκη* seems to me to miss the point of the passage and to introduce an unnecessary complication to it).

That 724 can mean what I have asserted it means can be demonstrated by a consideration of the following passages:

- Herodotos 4.175 τὸ δὲ παρὰ τὴν θάλασσαν ἔχοντα τὸ πρὸς ἐσπέρας Μάκαι, οἱ λόφους κείρονται ...
'The Makai cut <the hair on the top of their heads so as to produce> crests' (Stein ad loc. notes: *eine Art von Prolepsis*, 'sich die Haare so, das Schöpfe übrig bleiben'). An exact parallel is Athenaios 11.494f οἱ μέλλοντες ἀποκείρειν (-εσθαι Kaibel) τὸν σκόλλον ἐσθροί, φησι Πάμφιλος (RE 25), εἰσφέρουσι τῷ Ἡοακλεῖ μέγα ποτήριον ... (on σκόλλος see L.Robert, *Noms Indigènes*, 267f.).
- Aristophanes, *Birds* 806 σὺ δὲ (μάλιστα) ἔοικας κοψίχῳ γε σκάφιον ἀποτετιμένῳ.
'You are like a blackbird <with the top of its head> plucked <so as to produce the effect of> a(n upturned) bowl'.
- Aristophanes, *Lys.* 151 (for the context see above) δέλτα παρατετιμέναι.
'Our pubic region plucked so as to produce a delta'. This passage is controversial. Against the scholiast ad loc., Schulze, *Kl.Schr.* 365, Taillardat, *Les Images d'Aristophane*, p.77, and Henderson, *The Maculate Muse*, 146, who take delta to refer to the pubic region, the area plucked rather than the result of the plucking, there is the difficulty of the absence of the article. Contrast: 1) Aristophanes, *Lys.* 89 (pace Wilamowitz ad loc.)
κομψότατα τὴν φληγῶ γε παρατετιμέναι
2) Pherekrates, fr.108.28f.
κόραι δ' ἐν ἀμπεχόναϊς τριχάπτοις ἀστῶς
ἡρυλλῶναι τὰ δόδα καὶ κεκαρμέναι.
3) Our passage, *Ekk1.724*
τὸν χοῖρον.

Aristophanes, *Ekk1.624*, which is often adduced to defend the omission of the article, is quite

different, and Aristophanes *Akharnēs* 119 ὃ θερμόβουλον προκτὸν ἐξυρμένε is not quite the same - the adjective makes a difference (cf. Euripides, *Kykl.* 227), and in any case this is high flown parody (cf. Menander, *Asp.* 71f.). Although the absence of the article is not perhaps a decisive support for them, I think that Wilamowitz and van Leeuwen are right here, particularly since the phenomenon in question is to be observed on vases (cf. Dover, *CR* ns18 [1968], 158f.), as for example in the top picture of no. 135 Boardman, *Athenian Red Figure Vases: The Archaic Period* (although we must proceed cautiously in making inferences from art about real life practices, as Boardman himself warns, *JHS* 100[1980], 245). See also Süß, *RM* 97(1954), 151f..

- d) Aristophanes, *Thesm.* 838 ὑστέραν αὐτὴν καθῆσθαι σκάφιον ἀποκεκαρμένην.
'This woman will have to sit <the hair on the top of her head> cut <in such a fashion as to be> a bowl' ~ passage b).
- e) Hermippos, fr. 14 (I p. 228 Kock) οἴμοι, τί δρώσω σύμβολον κεκαρμένος;
'When, <my head> is shorn <in such a way that it looks like half of> a σύμβολον'. See Dobree, *Adversaria* IV, 236, for explanation, which W. Müri, in his valuable study of the word σύμβολον (*Griechische Studien*, Basel 1976, 5), ignores, and takes the line to mean 'Weh, was soll ich tun ohne symbolon?'. For κείρω 'steal' he compares Herondas 3.39 (see also Taillardat, *Les Images d'Aristophane*, 535). Against this one may note that Pollux, even if he did not understand the line, took it to refer to some type of haircut. I also miss the article on this interpretation (contrast Aristophanes *Akh.* 163).
- f) Sophokles, *Oinomaos* fr. 473 Radt Σκυθιστὶ χειρόμακτρον ἐκκεκαρμένος.
'A man shorn <as to his head> Skythian fashion (i.e. very close) <so that> a napkin <is produced>'. ('so, gründlich geschworen, dass ein χειρόμακτρον resultiert', U. Hofer, *RM* 78[1925], 168 n.2). This is perhaps the most remarkable of the passages in that the part shorn is now detachable from its owner (cf. perhaps the passages with δέρε-ιν mentioned below): he has been scalped (see Pearson ad loc.).

In all of these passages a transformation is described. A part of the body is shorn or plucked in such a way that the part changes its appearance and can be compared with some other object. These expressions exaggerate the likeness by identifying the changed surface with this other object. We are confronted with a form of utterance bolder than one in which someone's hair is said to be cut à la façon de ... : rather what is being said is that so and so's body has had a part of it changed so that it has become such and such.

Ekklesiazousai 724 displays (uniquely) this type of expression in its full form and enables us to account for the construction of the accusatives in the other passages. In it alone the area affected by the tonsuring is expressed - τὸν χοῖρον. κατωνάκην is to be regarded as predicative and in agreement with χοῖρον. In the other passages we are to understand accusatives (retained or 'of reference' or whatever one cares to call them) of the body part affected (they are indicated by angled brackets in my paraphrases). It is with these understood accusatives that the various predicative substantives are in agreement. The construction is an extension (with substantive for predicative adjective) of what is seen in its simplest form in Herondas 2.67ff.

ὄρητ' ἄνδρες,

τὰ τίματα αὐτῆς καὶ κάτωθεν κᾶνωθεν
ὥς λεῖα ταῦτ' ἔτιλλεν ἀναγῆς οὗτος.

'How he plucked these τίματα so that they became λεῖα'.

'λεῖα est une prolepse' Groeneboom (τὰ τίματα means 'the areas plucked': see Cunningham ad loc.).

An analogy for the predicative or proleptic use of the substantive found in our passage occurs in some expressions used with the verb δέρε-ιν (there is a slight difference in that in the passages just quoted there is a transformation in the appearance of the person while in the ones to come the man himself is totally transformed - illogically since it is his skin that will make the bag).

Note: a) Solon fr. 33.5ff. (West) ἦθελον γὰρ κεν κρατήρας, πλοῦτον ἄφθονον λαβὼν
καὶ τυραννεύσας Ἀθηναίων μόνον ἡμέρην μίαν,
ἄσχος ὅσπερ ὄνειρον δεδάρεθαι καπιτετρίφθαι γένα.

(cf. Aristophanes, *Clouds*)

b) Aristophanes, *Knights* 370 δερῶ σε θύλακον κλοπῆς.

Similar prolepses are to be found in more elevated genres (note [Aiskhylos] *Prometheus* 1023, and cf. Fraenkel on Aiskhylos *Agamemnon* 17), but unless I am mistaken there does not seem to be much notice taken of them in the standard grammars.

I must mention in concluding two passages which obviously belong with the examples I have been discussing, but whose obscurity makes any explanation speculative.

First there is the much disputed Aristophanes *Akharnēs* 849:

Κρατῖνος δὲ κεκαρμένος μοιχὸν μὲ μάχαίρα.

If what I have been arguing is correct, Kratinos (whoever he is) should be described not merely as the wearer of a hairstyle called 'adulterer' because it was regarded as the kind of hairstyle adulterers tended to wear (cf. 'Co-respondent' shoes, which do not look like a co-respondent but are so named because they are regarded as the habitual wear of such a person), but as having been shorn in such a way that the body-part treated looked like an adulterer. Despite its complication the explanation suggested by Erbse, *Erans* 52(1954), 82f., and accepted by Taillardat p. 63, seems to me to be on the right path. Kratinos is so bald that he looks like an adulterer who has been caught in the act and has suffered one of the indignities to which unlucky μοιχοί were liable

(N.B. Aristophanes, *Ploutos* 168 and cf. Aristophanes, *Clouds* 1083 with Dover's note). The top of his head is so bare that it looks like a depilated *μοιχός*.

The second passage is a fragment of Eupolis' *Khrysoun Genos* cited under the lemma *σαβύτρου* (glossed as a type of haircut) in a sixth century glossary (P.Oxy.1803). This is Eupolis fr.99 Austin (fr.278A Edmonds):

καὶ καρα... ὥς ἔμ' ἔλθε
ἐξυρμένον σαβύτρου.

The absence of a context and the uncertainty regarding the reading of the first line make interpretation extremely uncertain. Lexicographers (Photios, Hesychios) gloss *σαβύτρου* as the female organ. It is not immediately obvious what sort of tonsure could be so described. If the reference is to a beard one might envisage a delta shaped cut. If the area treated is the head explanation is more difficult. Edmonds' reading *καταρής* in the first line takes the reference to be to the parting of the hair. For the female organ regarded as a split or crack cf. Henderson, *The Maculate Muse*, 147, and Hipponax, fr.2a West *Συνδικὸν διδασκαλῆα*. However one envisages the transformation, there remains the problem of the plural. I cannot find a way of accounting for it.

The Editor permits himself the observation that he had intended to suggest that the slave women's treatment of their pubic hair was not so much deliberate as forced on them by law. But he accepts that *κατωνάκη* ... ἀποστειλμένος, 'plucked like a *κατωνάκη*' can mean 'not plucked', and may well have been wrong in thinking that the *κατωνάκη* in some way indicated servile status. P.E.Slater, *The Glory of Hera*, 1968, 12-23, finds psychological explanations for the Greek male fear of female pubic hair, and has provoked Martin Kilmer, of Ottawa, into a re-examination of the evidence for public depilation (including the passage under discussion here) in an article hopefully forthcoming (though not in *LCM* since it requires extensive illustration).

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R.J.Seager(Liverpool): *The political significance of Cicero's pro Roscio*

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The *pro Roscio* has of late attracted considerable attention (in general, cf. W.Stroh, *Taxis und Taktik*, Stuttgart 1975, 58ff.). In particular the subject of this paper remains much debated. That the speech was a serious and courageous attack on Sulla is argued by V.Buchheit (*Historia* 24 [1975], 570ff.; *Chiron* 5[1975], 193ff.); that it was not is the contention of T.E.Kinsey (*AC* 49 [1980], 173ff., unfortunately unaware of Buchheit). Some further progress may be made.

1. The *Rosciana* as a Political Speech

Cicero insists from the outset that the case of Roscius is a political one, in which the advocate for the defence will be constrained to speak *de re publica* (2, 143). But despite this invocation of necessity it is clear on several occasions that the political element in the proceedings is being deliberately stressed if not exaggerated, in the appeal to the president of the court, M.Fannius, and elsewhere (11, 14). The threat to Roscius is an attack on the fabric of the state (148) and all may be affected by it (7, 129). The jury's mercy is the one hope of salvation not only for Roscius but also for the state; if the verdict goes the other way, the republic will be in desperate case (150, 153). The jury must therefore seize its chance to heal the wounds of the state (154). In short there can be no doubt that Cicero has quite consciously manufactured for himself the opportunity to deliver a political manifesto. It is therefore important to try to determine more accurately than has hitherto been done the precise end to which that manifesto was directed.

2. Sulla and Chrysogonus

The sale of Roscius' property at a ridiculously low price is said by Chrysogonus to have been carried out by Sulla (6). Cicero does not underwrite the claim, and his own reference to Sulla is studiously honorific. That the ascription of responsibility to Sulla is made only by the opposition is repeated later (143). Here the implied contrast between the attitudes of Roscius and Cicero may indicate that Cicero, unlike his innocent client, does not accept the morality and legality of what has happened; it does not, however, suggest that Cicero, any more than Roscius, agrees that Sulla was involved (contra: Buchheit 577f.). It may seem as if Cicero contradicts himself a page later (146: *in eis rebus quas L.Sulla gessit*), but nothing more need be intended here than an acknowledgement of Sulla's overall responsibility for the institution of the proscriptions. It is true that on occasion Cicero puts his own views into the mouths of the opposition, but that can hardly be the case here, since he specifically denies in his own person the truth of Chrysogonus' claim.

That Sulla was in fact ignorant both of the murder and of Chrysogonus' machinations over Roscius' property is repeatedly asserted (21, 25f., 91, 111). Moreover, his ignorance, according to Cicero, was entirely excusable. Sulla had the burden of running the entire state on his shoulders and could not be expected to keep a check on the activities of each and every individual who got up to no good while his back was turned (22, 130f.). That he would, had he known what was going on, have repudiated Chrysogonus is implied by Cicero's statement that Chrysogonus would rather have died than let news of his activities get to Sulla (26, cf. 127). Cicero also makes it clear that in the civil war Sulla had stood for the restoration of the traditional framework of society, and that that restoration could not have been accomplished without a certain amount of

bloodshed (136f., 139).

The only certain criticism of Sulla, and that hardly direct or personal, is the implication that he had had too much power (22, 131) (cf. Buchheit, *Historia* 24[1975], 581, 588). Both the stress on the fact that Sulla wielded power alone and the striking phrase *rem publicam reget* suggest disapproval of Sulla's position, if not of the man himself.

Chrysogonus on the other hand is savagely handled (cf. Buchheit, *Chiron* 5[1975], 198ff.). He is repeatedly insulted: he is the wicked freedman (22, 130), the worthless slave (140f.), worse than any brigand or pirate (146). His name is mocked (124). He is criminal and corrupt (6, 130, 135), he abuses his *gratia* and *potentia* (6, 28, 35, 60, 122, 135, 141, cf. 25f., 58 and the reference to *dominatio* at 140). He is responsible for bringing the prosecution to protect his ill-gotten gains (6, 34, 49, 132), though Cicero does not accuse him of involvement in the murder (20, 35, 80f., 96, 103, 105ff., 110, 115, 122, 125ff., 130).

3. *iniquitas temporum* (cf. Buchheit, *Hist.* 579, *Chir.* 196)

Because of the iniquity of the times *homines nobilissimi*, though they are present in court, are afraid to speak in Roscius' defence (1, 148). Even Cicero himself cannot speak as freely as he would wish, for the times are a hindrance to freedom of speech (9). Much is made of the cruelty of the times and of the absence of law and order, themes combined in a play on words early in the speech (3: *non modo ignoscendi ratio uerum etiam cognoscendi consuetudo iam de ciuitate sublata est*). This is the first trial for murder after a long interval, though many execrable murders have taken place during that period (11). If the jury does not take a firm stand, criminals will become so bold that murder will be committed within the very purlieus of the court (12). Men were about in arms at Rome night and day, wallowing in booty and blood: it was a bitter and an iniquitous time (81, cf. 89). Those who took advantage of Sulla's preoccupation with other matters to exploit the situation put a stop to the due processes of law as if the republic were shrouded in eternal night (91). Murderers were abroad in plenty, on the prosecutor's own admission, and men were being killed with impunity (80, 93f.). Roscius' one hope lies in the traditional mercy of the jurors; if they have been hardened by the cruelty that has been rife in the state, then it is all up with him (150). The jurors must realize that the Roman people, which was once reckoned lenient even to its enemies, has recently been infected with cruelty at home, and they must put a stop to this evil, which has not only claimed so many victims, but, perhaps even worse, has made the survivors callous (154).

To add insult to injury, now that the courts are restored, those who profited from their suspension are attempting to set the law's seal of approval on their illegal conduct, hoping that the jury will help them to consolidate their hold on their booty (6; cf. Buchheit, *Chir.* 204). It is scandalous that they should think the jurors suitable persons to vote them into secure possession of what they have seized by murder (8). The bringing of the charge is an effort on their part to abuse the judicial system for their own wanton profit (54). Has the jury been chosen, Cicero indignantly asks, to condemn those who have succeeded in escaping the murderers' knives (151)?

Cicero allows himself to express discreet disapproval of the institution of the proscriptions, which the senate had not approved because the measure was harsher than was countenanced by ancestral tradition (153). But the abuse of the proscriptions practised by the villains of the piece is a far worse matter (137). The first dubious feature is the price at which Chrysogonus claims to have bought the property (6). Nor does Cicero mince his words about the manner in which Chrysogonus acquired the estate (6, 137). Secondly, the proscriptions were already a thing of the past when Roscius' name was added to the list (21). There was no way in which his estate could legally have been put up for auction: he had not been killed in the ranks of the enemy, for during the civil war he had been a member of Sulla's forces, and he had been killed in peace time, at Rome, on his way home from a dinner (125ff., 130).

4. The Nobles

Cicero affirms his own dedication to the *causa nobilitatis*, which nobody, he claims, will presume to doubt (135), and his delight in its victory (136, 142). The elder Roscius had also been a devoted supporter, both in general and in the civil war (16, 21, 126). But the speech begins with an unflattering picture of great men sitting, silenced by fear, acquiescent in the evils of the times (1). They are guilty of neglect of *officium*. Equivocation about their obligations has led them to abandon their customary practice of speaking in defence of a man's life and fortunes, and Roscius has been left in the lurch (4f., cf. 148). A few have done their duty. P. Scipio and M. Metellus tried to secure two slaves from T. Roscius for questioning, but met with no success (77, 119f.). Caecilia Metella has harboured Roscius and made it possible for him to appear alive in court to defend himself (27, 147). M. Messalla has assisted Roscius in the public sphere, just as Caecilia has in the domestic; if he were old and strong enough, he would have spoken for him (149). The tally is not impressive. One failed enterprise and the help of a woman and a youthful weakling merely highlight the inertia of healthy adult males (149).

Towards the end of the speech the nobles are subjected to a tremendous diatribe. Now that Sulla has restored their *auctoritas*, it is up to them to retain it. If they indulge in or approve of murder and rapine, if they do not show vigilance, virtue, courage and mercy, they will be forced to sacrifice their position (139). They must give up the notion that their interests are bound up with those of Chrysogonus and stop regarding attacks on him as insults to themselves (140, cf. 124, which does not, despite Buchheit, *Hist.* 585, refer to Sulla, 135). Resistance to Chrysogonus and company will not merely not damage the cause of the nobility, it will adorn it

(138). For the victory of the nobility should not mean that the nobles' slaves and freedmen are allowed to run riot (141). If it does, then Cicero will be forced to conclude that he was mad to choose their side. If, on the other hand, that victory is to be a glory and a benefit to the republic and the Roman people, his words will be welcome to all the best and noblest men. Any man who thinks that he and his cause are damaged when Chrysogonus is attacked does not understand that cause, though he may know himself only too well. The cause is all the more glorious if resistance is offered in its name to such creatures, but the man who binds himself to Chrysogonus has betrayed the cause (142). The war was fought to restore the nobility, so that they would defend the innocent, resist injustice, and show their power by saving men, not destroying them. If all those who were born to this mission performed it, they would serve the state better and be less unpopular (149).

5. Praise of traditional values.

The elder Roscius is introduced as a splendid example of the municipal worthy, both in respect of his position at Ameria and his relationship with great men at Rome (15f.). The younger, an ideal son, devoted himself to the rural life in accordance with his father's wishes (18). In this father and son were following a pattern that was to be expected of men of their class and dad background (43, cf. 47). It was this virtuous rustic way of life that made Rome great (50) for the country is the home of frugality, hard work and justice, whereas the city breeds luxury, avarice and crime (75). Faced with crisis, the son behaved in an eminently proper and traditional way: he called a family council and, acting on its advice, sought the assistance of a hereditary patroness (27, 149).

Cicero also speaks for the sanctity of mandate, on which in some degree the structure of society depends (111, 115, 117), and in his comments on Sulla's victory insists that it stood for *dignitas* at home and *auctoritas* abroad, for the granting to every man of the honour and rank that were his due.

6. The Appeal to the Jury

The jury should resist the crimes of the *audaces* and protect the innocent, otherwise criminal greed and daring will know no bounds (7f., 12, 36). It should crush the *potentia* of men like Chrysogonus (36, 122). It is free to make the right decision, but if it tolerates the activities of a Chrysogonus it will lose that freedom (138f.). It must not allow itself to be transformed into a back-up force at the disposal of failed assassins (151), but must use its power to heal the ills of the republic by putting an end to the cruelty that has disfigured it (154).

7. Conclusion

Such is Cicero's political manifesto. It is not an attack on Sulla. Almost nothing is said against him, and he is carefully dissociated from the crimes of Chrysogonus. It is true that the protracted attack on the *iniquitas temporum* could be seen as veiled criticism of Sulla, for Sulla was undoubtedly responsible for the nature of the times (thus Buchheit, *Historia* 24[1975], 577ff.). But when the treatment of this theme is considered in conjunction with the praise of the traditional Italian way of life, the exhortations to the jury and the sermon to the nobility, it should be clear that that is not its primary function. Not because Cicero approved of Sulla, but rather because Sulla was no longer relevant. By the time of the trial, Sulla had retired (failure to realize this diminishes the value of part of Buchheit's treatment (*Chiron* 5[1975], 204ff.: the question cannot be discussed here, but it is my view that Sulla must have resigned long enough before the end of 81 for his dramatic gesture to have some meaning). The black picture of the recent past and the present is there to add weight to the demand that times must change, and whether times changed, whether Sulla's victory was belatedly to acquire the significance that for Cicero it had always been intended to have rested now not with Sulla but with the *Sullani*. The *Rosciana* is not a retrospective attack on Sulla. Rather it looks to the future, delivering a warning and an exhortation to those men in whose power he had left the state to shoulder their responsibilities in an honourable manner.

What was Cicero's objective in making such an exhortation? Was it simply a firework display to enhance his reputation as an orator (thus Kinsey, *AC* 49[1980], 186, 190)? Probably not, though that motive will surely have been present. The speech contains, as Buchheit stresses (*Chir.* 205ff.), an expression of Cicero's fundamental beliefs, and it presents Cicero the *novus* behaving as the *nobiles* should have behaved but had conspicuously failed to do (cf. Buchheit, *Chir.* 209ff.). But he was hardly risking his life or his career. Sulla might well have approved of his position. As for the *nobiles*, it is highly likely that Roscius' patrons had employed Cicero to administer a slap on the wrist to Chrysogonus in an affair that rightly seemed to them too trivial to require bigger guns (thus Kinsey, 186ff.). It will no doubt have come as a surprise to them to find their advocate exaggerating the importance of the case beyond measure and lecturing them on their moral and political duties. But in certain circumstances *novi* enjoyed greater licence in speech than the *nobiles* themselves (cf. *Cluent.* 111f.), while good *nobiles* should, as Cicero says, have agreed with him. So Cicero had the best of both worlds. He was able to attract a good deal of attention by exploiting an at first sight unpromising commission in order to deliver himself of a passionate statement on subjects that were clearly already close to his heart: law and order, traditional values, and the moral and political responsibilities of the governing class. At the same time he could feel reasonably confident that nobody who mattered would hold it against him, even if his vanity would not allow him to reflect that he might be too insignificant for anyone yet to care what he said about anything.

In *Poem VII.12* Theocritus calls Lykidas a man of Kydonia. There is no hint as to where Kydonia might be, but Wilamowitz thought of a connexion with Dosiadas the Cretan¹; later he was content more cautiously to assert 'nur die Heimatsbezeichnung Kydonia muss als real gelten'², without discussing whether the home of Lykidas might have lain in Kos or elsewhere - for instance at the Cretan Kydonia. A.S.F.Gow in commenting on the passage remarked that in this very personal poem the geographical adjectives could well be more than mere ornament; in line 65 Ptelea and in lines 71 and 72 Akharnai and Lykope have been referred to otherwise unknown localities in Kos. So, he inferred, 'if that is right, it is possible that a Coan Cydonia should be added to the list'³.

So far as I know, it has not been noticed in connexion with *Poem VII* that Kydonia is a Koan toponym. A Κυδωνία in the island is not attested from antiquity, but, as I was told in Kephalos in September 1980, there is still a neighbourhood called Κυδωνιά to the southwest of modern Antimacheia, not far from the present airport.

The existence of a Koan Κυδωνιά is confirmed by maps. For example, the map of Kos currently available from Messrs Dion. and Bas.Loukopoulou of 10 Stoa Nikoloudi, Athens, has it⁴. There are few trees in the neighbourhood now - let alone quince-trees, and there is little habitation. But also there is no sign that the toponym is the result of antiquarianism among cartographers; rather, we may have, except for the shift of accent characteristic of ancient feminine nouns in -ία in modern guise⁵, a survival of an Antimacheian deme-name⁶.

The existence of the Koan Kydonia does not help us to decide whether Lykidas was an imaginary character or a god in disguise or a poet who lived the life of a goatherd or a goatherd in Kos who was also a poet. Nor does it show that Lykidas was or was not a pseudonym. What it does show is that Theocritus, in calling Lykidas *Kydonikos*, may well have been deliberately connecting him with Kos. The connexion could still be deliberate, even if, as has been suggested, 'Lykidas is a symbol of the bucolic world from which Theokritos derived the fundamental ideas for a truly original genre of poetry'⁷.

1. *De Lycophr.Alex.* (1884) 12, *non vidi*: I take the reference from F.Jacoby's commentary on Dosiadas <von Kydonia?>, *F.Gr.Hist.* No.458 (Koemm., Vol.IIIB, Noten p.201). Cf. also Wilamowitz, *Die Textgeschichte der Griechischen Bukoliker* (Phil.Unt. 18, Berlin 1906) 162 note 1.
2. *op.cit.*, note 1 *supra*, (1906) 162.
3. *Theocritus* Vol.II(Cambridge 1950) 135.
4. I thank Mr John Leatham for obtaining a copy for me.
5. A.Thumb, *Handbook of the Modern Greek Vernacular* (tr. S.Angus, Edinburgh 1912) 11-12, §10.1.
6. Known Antimacheian demes are discussed by Susan M.Sherwin-White, *Ancient Cos* (*Hypomnemata* 51, Göttingen 1978) 60-61. There is a valuable discussion of Koan topography in Theokritos by W. Geoffrey Arnott, 'The Mound of Brasilas in Theocritus' Seventh Idyll' in *Quaderni Urbinate di Cultura Classica* N.S. 3(32) 99-106. Compare G.Zanker, *C.O.* 30(1980) 373-377.
7. K.J.Dover, *Theocritus. Select Poems* (London 1971) 150. Like Gow, Dover recognises that Κυδωνικός may refer to an otherwise unattested locality in Kos: *op.cit.* 146. A Cretan Kydonian is Κυδωνιάτης (Strabo 10.4.12) rather than Κυδωνικός, but Steph.Byz. s.v. Κυδωνία mentions other forms of the *ethnikon*: ὁ πολίτης Κυδωνιάτης καὶ Κύδων καὶ Κυδώνιος καὶ Κυδωνάιος, καὶ Κυδωνία θηλυκῶς καὶ Κυδωνίς, καὶ Κυδωνικός ἀνήρ.

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F.R.D.Goodyear(Bedford College, London): *Pompeius Trogus and the Oxford Latin Dictionary*

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Naturally the compilers of the *Oxford Latin Dictionary* have to be selective, but, whatever else they may exclude, they ought always to cite the earliest attestations of the words and usages they record. It is therefore unfortunate that they have omitted any mention of Pompeius Trogus. A speech from his *Historiae Philippicae* is preserved verbatim at Justin 38.4-7 (see 38.3.11 *quam orationem dignam duxi cuius exemplum breuitati huius operis insererem*), while a few small fragments of the *De animalibus* survive elsewhere. Since Trogus had probably completed his work by A.D. 10, and cannot with any plausibility be put later than A.D. 20, it follows that certain entries in *OLD* badly need correction. Here are the instances I have noticed: there may well be more. I give along with the passages of Trogus the earliest writers whom *OLD* cite.

amaritudo = 'bitterness, harshness'. Trogus apud Just. 38.5.5 *inter hanc decretorum amaritudinem*. *OLD* cite Val.Max. and Sen. *Cohtr.*. In *TLL* 1.1817.53-4 Trogus has his rightful place.

carnosus. Fr. 10 *Seel qui carnosos a naribus angulos habent*. *OLD* cite Cels. and Plin. *N.H.*. In *TLL* no mention of Trogus, but Plin. *N.H.* 11.276, where the fragment appears, is listed.

colluuius, 'applied to a conglomeration of worthless people'. 38.7.1 *se ... clariorem illa colluuiie conuenarum esse*. *OLD* cite only Tac.. In *TLL* 3.1666.12-13 Trogus has his rightful place.

dubium an (used as in the example which follows). 38.7.6 *bello dubium facili magis an ubere*. The other earliest attestations of precisely this usage (analogous usages may be traced further back) are found in the later work of Ovid (*Met.*, *F.*, *Tr.*, and *E.P.*): see *TLL* 5.1.2114.10ff., where Trogus is duly recorded. In *OLD* we find *Qv. Tr.* 4.4.69, but no mention of Trogus, who may yet, by a narrow margin, have anticipated Ovid.

immoror = 'stay, linger (in a place)'. 38.4.6 *sedecim annis Italiae ... immoratum*. OLD cite Cels. and Colum.. Trogius is also overlooked in TLL.

immoror = 'delay, linger (over a topic)'. 38.4.13 *ne ueteribus inmoremur exemplis*. OLD cite V.Max. and Sen. Ep.. Trogius is also overlooked in TLL.

imputo = 'lay (to the charge of a person), impute, ascribe (faults or sim.)'. 38.5.8 *inputari sibi, si qua Gordius aut Tigranes faciat*. OLD cite Rut. Lup. and Ov. Met.. Priority is a little uncertain. If Trogius is not the first, he may be the second writer attested so to use the verb. He is also overlooked in TLL.

inundo = 'crowd, swarm over'. 38.4.15 *Cimbros ... more procellae inundasse Italiam*. OLD cite Curt. and Sil.. In TLL 7.2.248.57 Trogius has his rightful place.

One might add some minor matters. For instance, *derisores* (Fr. 10 Seel) seems to be the noun's first occurrence in prose. OLD predictably omits Trogius, while at TLL 5.1633.34-5 Trogius' words are cited as if they belonged to Pliny, who preserves the fragment. Lexicographers are prone to stumble over quotations in the writings which they excerpt, sometimes uncritically.

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T.E.Kinsey(Glasgow): *Virgil, Aeneid* 4.550-1

*non licuit thalami expertem sine crimine vitam
degere more ferae, tales nec tangere curas.*

These lines come towards the end of a speech in which Dido is reviewing her position after learning that Aeneas is determined to leave Carthage. Their natural meaning is 'It was not possible (for me) to lead a life outside wedlock without blame after the manner of a wild creature and not experience distress like this'. The first line by itself could refer to blameless widowhood but it would be odd to make the wild creature of the second an example of such a state. In a passage involving the relationship between the sexes a phrase like *more ferae* usually refers to promiscuity; see the wealth of material collected by A.S.Pease in his notes on these lines (*Publi Vergili Maronis, Aeneidos Liber Quartus*, Cambridge Mass. 1935, reprinted Darmstadt 1967).

However the more usual interpretation is exemplified by R.G.Austin's translation (*P.Vergili Maronis Aeneidos Liber Quartus*, Oxford 1955, on 550f.) 'You' (i.e. Anna) 'would not let me live my life in widowhood, innocently, like a woodland creature, without tasting the bitterness of love like this'. Austin recognizes the difficulties but the reason for adopting this view is given with references, not all of which appear relevant, by G.W.Williams (*Tradition and Originality in Roman Poetry*, Oxford 1968, p.381) 'Everywhere Dido or her sister mentions her relationship to Aeneas it is marriage (16-18; 33; 48; 59; 307ff.; 314ff.; 324; 431; 495f.; 548ff.; 597; 648; 650; 659)'. How cogent is this argument?

Certainly the only relationship with Aeneas which Dido and Anna contemplated at the beginning of Book 4 is marriage, and certainly after events in the cave (165-8) Dido called the relationship marriage (172), but the crucial lines are 338-9 *nec coniugis umquam*

praetendi taedas aut haec in foedera veni. Aeneas bluntly denies that he had ever even offered marriage to Dido and in her reply (365-87) Dido appears to accept his denial. She reproaches him for lack of compassion (368-70) and gratitude (373-5) but not for desertion or breach of promise. It is true that in 431 she refers to *coniugium antiquum* and in 496 to *lectumque iugalem* but both phrases occur in speeches addressed to Anna, and it is natural enough that Dido should not be able to abandon her old claim before her sister. The context of 550-1 is however very different. Dido is communing with herself and paints her position in the blackest terms. At such a moment she might well describe herself as having lived outside wedlock like an animal. This follows naturally her reproach to her sister (548-9). Anna had led her to think that marriage with Aeneas was both desirable and possible (31-53) and it was this which at once heightened Dido's passion and weakened her resistance to it (54-5). As a result she found herself in a position she could not contemplate without distress. Another reason for distress is given in the last line; marriage or no marriage, she had broken faith with Sychaeus.

One further point: Dido refers to *fides* and *dextera* (307, 314, 597) and these have been taken to allude to marriage. However R.C.Monti (*The Dido Episode and the Aeneid*, Leiden 1981, pp.1-8) argues convincingly that they refer to the obligations which Aeneas contracted when he accepted Dido's hospitality.

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A.C.Lloyd, *Form and Universal in Aristotle* (ARCA Classical and Mediaeval Texts, Papers and Monographs 4), Liverpool, Francis Cairns, 1981. Paper, pp.vi + 89, £5.00. ISBN 0 905205 05 7

Professor Lloyd has long impressed all who have had the good fortune to discuss matters of ancient philosophy with him, and to participate in seminars at which he has been present, with his detailed and extensive knowledge of the Aristotelian and Platonic traditions in later antiquity; and this knowledge is put to good use in this important monograph. For in it he not only shows that a common interpretation of Aristotle's metaphysical position is mistaken, thus taking further the discussion to which he had already contributed in 'Aristotle's principle of individuation', *Mind* 79(1970), 519-529; he also sets the problem of understanding Aristotle in the context of the unbroken tradition of attempts at interpretation extending from antiquity to the present day. Of course, the antiquity of an interpretation does not prove its correctness, and Professor Lloyd stresses that it does not (p.5); but it may still assist us in the attempt to understand. It is not always realized to what extent modern commentaries on Aristotle rest on the foundations of their ancient and mediaeval predecessors.

The aim of the book is to show that Aristotelian forms should not be interpreted as universals *in rebus*, differing from Platonic forms only in that they cannot exist except in particulars - as if Aristotle had simply replaced the Platonic form, a 'one over many', with a 'one in many'. On the contrary, Aristotelian forms are numerically individual in each particular; a distinction must be drawn between the form, which does indeed exist *in re* but is individual rather than universal, and the universal, which is *post rem*, exists only potentially till it is thought (p.9), and has no real existence of its own either in things or in minds (p.14).

That the forms of different individuals are numerically distinct is a view which has found increasing favour with Aristotelian scholars recently; to the references I have given at LCM 5.10 (Dec.1980), 223, add E.Hartman, *Substance, Body and Soul; Aristotelian Investigations*, Princeton 1977, 61-64; H.Teloh, 'The Universal in Aristotle', *Apeiron* 13(1979), 70-78; and R.Heinaman, 'An argument in *Metaphysics* Z 13', *CQ* 30(1980), 72-85. Professor Lloyd supports it both by a detailed discussion of many Aristotelian texts (notably *Metaphysics* Z 13, A 5, and the numerous passages in which it is stated that forms can begin to exist and cease to exist) and also by examining it in relation to interpretations of Aristotle's position advanced in the first six centuries A.D..

This does however raise another issue, which is not central to Professor Lloyd's discussion, but does have a bearing on at least one of the passages with which he is concerned. Do the forms of individual men include the peculiar characteristics of those individual men, like Socrates' snub nose, or do they include only those features that are common to all members of the species qua members of the species, other features being accidents due to matter rather than to form? Professor D.M.Balme has recently argued against too rigid a correlation of form with specific essence in Aristotle ('Aristotle's Biology was not Essentialist', *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 62(1980), 1-12). On the other hand, there are passages in Aristotle which can be cited in support of the view that forms do not include individual peculiarities (notably *Metaphysics* Z 8 1034a7-8); and it would seem that this is Professor Lloyd's view too (cf. pp.7, 47, and pp. 521f. of his *Mind* 1970 article cited above). It was, furthermore, the view of the commentator Alexander of Aphrodisias (*de anima* 85.15ff.: I have discussed Alexander's metaphysical views more fully in section 8 of my *Forschungsbericht* forthcoming in *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt*).

But if indeed the peculiar characteristics of individuals are not included in or attributable to their forms, those forms differing, in the case of members of the same species, only numerically and in no other way, then it can be argued that form is 'universal' in the sense that it excludes individual peculiarities, even though it is not universal in the sense of being a one in, or over, a many. At LCM 5.10(Dec.1980), 224, I referred to these two senses as 'universal*' and 'universal' respectively; here they will be referred to rather as 'universal¹' and 'universal²'.

If such a distinction between universal¹ and universal² is allowed, it may render unnecessary the anxiety Professor Lloyd feels about the authenticity of the closing section of Alexander *Quaestio* 1.11b (Lloyd p.51), on the grounds that it there seems to be argued that the universal is prior to the individual (ironically, Moraux has claimed that not only the passage in question but the whole of the conclusion of the *Quaestio*, from 23.21, may not be an authentic expression of Alexander's views; this is on other grounds, concerned with the treatment of soul as a genus, and he supposes that it expresses a more orthodox Aristotelian view than Alexander's own (P.Moraux, *Alexandre d'Aphrodise: Exégète de la noétique d'Aristote*, Bibliothèque de la Faculté de Philosophie et Lettres de l'Université de Liège 99, Liège & Paris 1942, 61f.)). In fact, though, Alexander does not here say that the universal (*katholou*) is prior to the individual *simpliciter*, only that what is 'common' (*koinon*) is (24.17-20); and 'common' as opposed to universal may be precisely the way in which Alexander expresses 'universal¹' as opposed to 'universal²' (so S. Pines, 'A new fragment of Xenocrates and its implications', *Transactions of the American Philosophical Society* 51.2(1961), 28f.; his interpretation is challenged by H.Rahn, *Oriens* 16(1963), 301-6, but it is supported by the contrast between 24.19-20 and 24.11-14). And there is nothing inconsistent with the position taken by Alexander elsewhere, or by Aristotle, in saying that there can be no individual man unless the universal¹ nature of mankind exists (and vice versa),

even though there can be an individual man without there being a universal² nature of mankind (since in Alexander's view it is entirely accidental to an essence whether it is realized in one instance or in many; so at *Quaestio* 1.3 8.12ff. of the species, and at 1.11b 24.11-15 of the genus [Lloyd p.54]). Indeed, the statement that the individual only exists because the universal¹ does is found not only in *Quaestio* 1.11b, but also in Alexander's *de providentia* (p.89. 5 in H.-J. Ruland [ed.], *Die arabischen Fassungen zwei Schriften des Alexander von Aphrodisias*, diss. Saarbrücken 1976) and, of the relation of species to genus in his *Refutation of Xenocrates* (Pines, *Transactions of the American Philosophical Society* 51.2[1961], 28f.; though there is difficulty over the Arabic translations of the Greek terms here - cf. Rahn, *Oriens* 16[1963], 301-6).

It is true that just before, at *Quaestio* 1.11b 24.16-19, Alexander does say that the universal² genus is prior to the particulars; but it is prior to them precisely as particulars; (*en meret*). A man cannot be a particular man unless there are other men, and hence a universal² man; but he can still be a man, even if he is the only one.

The contrast between universal¹ and universal² may also have a bearing on the anxiety Professor Lloyd expresses (p.55) about saying that universals are the result of a process of abstraction, on the grounds that this may imply that they already existed (as in *re* universals), the process of abstraction only being needed to reveal them, as it were. We may happily accept, however, that the universal¹ form does indeed have real existence in the thing in question and is indeed 'revealed' in this way, even though this does not apply to the universal². The distinction in the individual between what is due to universal¹ form and what is an accident due to matter is a real distinction, not an arbitrary one that we impose; neither Aristotle nor Alexander is a nominalist. Individuals are members of the same species because they have similar universal¹ forms, and not vice versa (cf. Lloyd p.45).

It is true that Alexander does at one point say that what is universal and what is common exists only when it is thought (*de anima* 90.2-11). But this need not imply that the distinction between what is due to universal¹ form and what is due to matter is one which we impose, and which is posterior to the individual; Alexander's point may rather be that enmattered forms do not exist apart from their matter except when they are objects of thought. The context is not so much concerned with the metaphysical analysis of individuals composed of a combination of form and matter, as with arguing that it is only form which is not enmattered that can be the eternal object of intelligence and hence (intelligence being identical with its objects where there is no matter) eternal intelligence. Alexander's statement at *Quaestio* 2.28 79.16-18 that genera are constructed by the mental separation off of accompanying characteristics (Lloyd p.55) can be understood as reflecting the fact that the generic nature is always in fact found accompanied (not only by matter, but also) by specific differentiae; and at 78.18-20 it is the genus considered as genus (i.e. the universal² genus) that is called a 'mere name' (Lloyd p.50).

I do not indeed know whether or not Professor Lloyd would agree with the thoughts expressed in the preceding two paragraphs; the issues they raise are perhaps, as it were, tangential to the main theme of his book. This reflects the fact that his main concern is to avoid an unduly Platonizing interpretation of Aristotle or Alexander (the doctrine of the universal² *in re*); my concern is rather to avoid the opposite extreme of an arbitrary nominalism (the supposition that universal¹ forms do not exist *in rebus* either).

The theory of forms and universals is the central concern of Professor Lloyd's book. But it also has important things to say about Aristotle's treatment of thought and imagination, about the thinking of the Unmoved Mover, and about Alexander's doctrine of divine providence. It also includes the first translations into English of some important texts (Alexander *Quaestiones* 1.3, 1.11b, and 2.14; Simplicius *In categorias* 84f.), a bibliography, an index of passages cited and a general index. The book is excellently produced (it is pleasing to find a paperback that is properly sewn). On p.77 line 5, in the Bibliography, the references for Alexander's *De anima* and *Quaestiones* should be to *Supplementum Aristotelicum* 2.1 and 2.2 respectively, not to 1.1.

I began this review by emphasizing the way in which Professor Lloyd's book draws on his extensive knowledge of the exegesis of later antiquity. This prompts three rather general reflections, which I hope it will not be out of place to add here.

1. The issue with which Professor Lloyd is concerned, that of the status of universals, has been a perennial concern of philosophy from antiquity till the present day. Ancient philosophy is one branch of classical studies at least against which the charge of being irrelevant to modern concerns cannot be levelled. But this means that our understanding of ancient philosophical writers is constantly developing in the light of new attitudes and approaches in modern philosophy. Nothing could be more stultifying than the tendency, which I fear can be found among some classicists who are not specialists in ancient philosophy, to assume that, the more the study of ancient philosophy has to do with modern philosophy, the less it is a part of classical studies; this would simply ensure that classicists studied ancient philosophy in the light of the modern philosophical thought of a hundred years ago or fifty years ago (the times of Zeller and of Cornford respectively) rather than of the present day. The study of ancient philosophy can be more or less historically orientated; but neither an entirely historical study nor an entirely philosophical one, taking no account at all of the other aspect, is possible.

2. There is a vast area of ancient philosophy in the first six centuries A.D. which has until very recently been neglected by the vast majority of classicists (with honourable exceptions, of whom Professor Lloyd is one), especially in this country. The published ancient commentaries on

Aristotle must total in the order of half-a-million words; if one includes all extant neo-Platonic writings, and only those parts of Galen that are relevant to logic and to the history of the philosophy of science, the total must be more than doubled. Arabists have long been protesting that their study of the influence of Greek philosophy on Islamic philosophy has been hindered because classicists have not done their share of the work, neglecting this later period which is the one that directly preceded and influenced Islamic philosophy. It is true that there are three difficulties in studying the period; firstly the sheer volume of material, secondly the fact that so little is available in translation in any modern language, and thirdly the fact that a good working knowledge of Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics is a pre-requisite. Perhaps if times become more propitious again and we ever have flourishing graduate schools of Classics, this is where such work could be done; if so, undergraduate courses will need to equip students with a good knowledge of Greek and of the earlier period of ancient philosophy (which, contrary to the views of some classicists, can very well be studied before a student has learned much Greek, and may indeed be a useful and helpful accompaniment to the earlier stages of that process). But we must get rid of the assumption that nothing later than 322 B.C. in Greece or A.D. 180 in Rome is worth studying. Ancient historians, in the narrower sense of political and social historians, do not seem to have this assumption; and we are all 'ancient historians', in a wider sense.

3. One of the strengths of Classics as a subject is, or should be, that it includes a wide range of disciplines. The study of ancient philosophy flourishes in philosophy departments; some classicists seem to look on it as a rather marginal activity. The Arabs regarded Greek philosophy, along with Greek science, as the major contribution made by the ancient Greeks; the Middle Ages agreed with them concerning philosophy, and the Renaissance did not ignore it either. So for all but a small part of the time that has elapsed since the end of antiquity, it is the philosophy of the Greeks that has been most valued; and this should perhaps make us wonder whether the rather different estimation of the importance for us of the various aspects of ancient culture, which prevails today, may not after all turn out to reflect the fact that we are at the end of a period in the study of antiquity which will turn out, *sub specie aeternitatis*, to have been something of an aberration.